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NEGLIGENCE-BREACH OF Durr-STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF INFANT 
DEFENDANTS-One of the defendants, a child four years and eight months of 
age, while playing with infant plaintiff, threw a stone which struck a bottle 
near where plaintiff was standing. A chip of glass Hew from the bottle into the 
eye of plaintiff, resulting in injury. The action was brought by infant plaintiff's 
father individually and as guardian ad litem against infant defendant's father 
individually and as guardian ad litem. The trial court denied infant defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded with 
directions to dismiss the complaint as to infant defendant. The authorities do 
not generally distinguish between primary and contributory negligence of in-
fants; a child under five and one-half years of age is generally considered in-
capable of negligence. Shaske 11. Hron, 266 Wis. 384, 63 N.W. (2d) 706 (1954). 
There is not complete unanimity as to whether the liability of infants should 
be measured by a standard of care different from that required of adults in neg-
ligence cases.1 It is generally agreed, however, that to be free from contributory 
negligence a child need use only that measure of care which children of his age, 
intelligence and experience ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances.2 
The question arises as to whether a different measure of care should be required 
when the primary negligence of an infant is at issue. Most writers in the field 
recognize the application of the same rule to both classes of cases,3 and the 
Restatement of Torts is in accord with this view.4 Among the few cases involv-
_ing the issue of primary negligence of an infant there is considerable conflict. 
In addition to the instant case, five cases may be cited which involve the primary 
negligence of an infant and which apply the standard used in cases of contribu-
tory negligence. 5 Some of these apply the contributory negligence standard 
1 CLARK AND MAnsHALL, LAw OF CRIMEs, 5th ed., 125 (1952); Bohlen, ''Liability 
in Torts of Infants and Insane Persons," 23 MxcH. L. REv. 9 (1924). 
2 Shulman, "The Standard of Care Required of Children," 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1928). 
3 BURDICK, I.Aw oF ToRTs, 4th ed., 158 (1926); 1 CooLBY, ToRTs, 4th ed., 194 
(1932); PROSSER, ToRTS 1086 (1941); SALMOND, ToRTs, 11th ed., 70 (1953) .. Contra: 
1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, rev. ed., 341 (1941); Terry, "Negligence,'' 29 
HARv. L. •REv. 40 (1915). 
4 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §283, comment e (1934). 
5 Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. (2d) 310 at 315, 253 P. (2d) 675 (1953); Hoyt 
v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 182 P. (2d) 234 (1947); Haxvey v. Cole, 159 
Kan. 239, 153 P. (2d) 916 (1944); Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 
(1931); Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893 (1911). 
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after thoughtful consideration of what the proper measure of care should be, 6 
whereas one applies it with no reference to any possible differentiation. 7 On the 
other hand, three cases may be cited which apply the adult standard to deter-
mine the liability of an infant alleged to be primarily negligent,8 but none of 
these gives careful consideration to the question of whether a lesser standard is 
appropriate. The more recent cases favor the application of the same standard 
as that generally used for contributory negligence. 9 One situation involving 
special factors merits additional analysis.10 This is the case in which the infant 
defendant is a licensed driver and is accused of primary negligence in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. It may be argued that by obtaining a license to operate 
a vehicle, the infant defendant has assumed adult responsibilities, and for this 
reason should be deprived of the shield of infancy.11 On the other hand, it has 
been suggested that if the infant is required to meet adult standards he is being 
punished for not conforming to a standard which he may be incapable of meet-
ing.12 Finally, considerations of a child's natural development might militate 
against imposing upon him adult responsibilities. These considerations might 
well be of sufficient weight to rebut the opposing proposition that the injured 
party should be compensated where one of two innocent parties must suffer. It 
would be understandable, however, were a court to be more lenient toward the 
child whose injuries result partly from the negligence of another than toward 
the child whose act is the sole cause of injury to another.13 If infants who are 
alleged to be primarily negligent are to be judged by a standard different from 
that applied in contributory negligence cases, but less than that required of 
adults, what should that standard be? No answer has yet been offered, and none 
seems likely. 
Dale Van Winkle 
6 See Ellis v. D'Angelo and Charbonneau v. MacRury, note 5 supra. 
7 Hoyt v. Rosenberg, note 5 supra. 
8 Hird v. Milne, [1930] 3 D.L.R. 513; House v. Fry, 30 Cal. App. 157, 157 P. 500 
(1916); Stringer v. Frost, 116 Ind. 477, 19 N.E. 331 (1889). Several older cases invoked 
the rule that there was liability for any injury except those arising from "unavoidable 
accidents." See Conway v. Reed, 66 Mo. 346 (1877); Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373 (1856); 
Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 391 (1829). Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 436 (1855), 
has been cited for the proposition that infant defendants should be held to the same measure 
of care required of adults. It is submitted that the court in substance ruled only that age 
should not be taken into account where the intelligence and experience of the infant enable 
him to exercise mature judgment. This is in reality the application of the standard usually 
used in the contributory negligence cases. 
9 See notes 5 and 8 supra. Dicta supporting the application of the contributory negli-
gence standard may be found in a number of cases. See, e.g., Reid v. City Coach Co., 215 
N.C. 469, 2 S.E. (2d) 578 (1939); Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 241 N.W. 535 
(1932). Contrary dicta may be found in Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W. 437 
(1919). 
10 Charbonneau v. MacRury, note 5 supra; Harvey v. Cole, note 5 supra. 
1179 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1153 (1931). 
12 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 478 (1952); 15 MINN. L. REv. 834 (1931). 
13 Shulman, "The Standard of Care Required of Children," 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1928). 
